That is, indeed the question! It fascinates me that this (actually not so) philosophical question spans a number of realms -- including simulation theory. Part of the debate must be how complete an illusion needs to be before illusion and reality are indistinguishable – and of course boundary conditions (and who sets them) become exceptionally important then
Indeed. And the question is harder still in the context of something as ephemerally hard to define as 'thinking'. Dennett once quipped that you don't get wet observing a numerical model simulating a hurricane, and so it is, but this distinction seems less clear in the more abstract domain of thought.
What is the difference between being able to "actually" think for oneself... and absolutely convincingly giving the illusion of being able to do so?
That is, indeed the question! It fascinates me that this (actually not so) philosophical question spans a number of realms -- including simulation theory. Part of the debate must be how complete an illusion needs to be before illusion and reality are indistinguishable – and of course boundary conditions (and who sets them) become exceptionally important then
Indeed. And the question is harder still in the context of something as ephemerally hard to define as 'thinking'. Dennett once quipped that you don't get wet observing a numerical model simulating a hurricane, and so it is, but this distinction seems less clear in the more abstract domain of thought.